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Abstract 
In this study, we develop an evolutionary game model to analyse how human 
relations evolve in a context characterised by declining face-to-face interactions 
and growing online social participation. Our results suggest that online networks 
may constitute a coping response allowing individuals to “defend” their social life 
from increasing busyness and a reduction in the time available for leisure. 
Internet-mediated interaction can play a positive role in preventing the disruption 
of ties and the weakening of community life documented by empirical studies. In 
this scenario, the digital divide is likely to become an increasingly relevant factor 
of social exclusion, which may exacerbate inequalities in well-being and 
capabilities.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic development and technological progress continuously and profoundly transform our way 
of living. Recently, the advent of the Internet and online networks has made economic and cultural 
changes even more radical and rapid, causing a major shift towards new types of social interaction. 
Studies in the social capital literature have documented two stylised facts: first, indicators of social 
participation declined in the years that preceded the social networking revolution (Bartolini et al., 
2013; Costa & Kahn, 2003; Putnam, 2002; Sarracino, 2010). Second, in the last five years, the 
success of social networking sites (SNSs) has resulted in a steep rise in online social participation 
(Duggan & Brenner, 2013; Smith, 2013). Despite the immensity of these transformations, we still 
lack a systematic theoretical analysis of the role of online interactions in the evolution of human 
relations. It is also not clear whether Internet usage and SNSs may accelerate the decline in social 
participation, or if they offer a way to support social relationships against the threats posed by the 
disruption of ties and the weakening of community life documented by empirical studies.  
In this paper, we draw on the empirical literature on social capital and computer-mediated 
communication to develop a theoretical framework for an analysis of how human relations may 
evolve in a context characterised by declining face-to-face interactions and growing online social 
participation. More specifically, we aim to deepen our understanding of 1) the circumstances that 
may exacerbate the decline in social participation; 2) the extent to which Internet-mediated 
interaction can help in preventing “social poverty traps” (Antoci et al., 2007); and 3) how the 
decline in social participation affects the relative performance of the different types of participation.  
In our framework, agents can choose to participate socially or to withdraw from social 
relations, or at least reduce them to the minimum, in order to devote all their available time to work. 
Following Antoci et al. (2012a, 2013a), we assume that individuals who participate socially develop 
interactions in two ways: 1) using a “social networking strategy” (hereafter SPN, Social 
Participation through online Networks), within which social participation takes place both by means 
of online networking and face-to-face interactions. This strategy entails different degrees of 
Internet-mediated interaction according to individual preferences and the characteristics of their 
reference groups: in general, we think of SPN agents as individuals who develop social ties online 
at their convenience—for example, by staying in touch with friends and acquaintances, or 
interacting with unknown others, through SNSs—and meet their contacts in person whenever they 
want or have time. On the other hand, at the extreme end of this strategy, SPN agents can develop 
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an entire social life online, as in the case of Japanese hikikomori5. These agents will never 
physically meet their Facebook friends. 2) As an alternative, socially participating individuals can 
choose not to use Internet-mediated communication and to develop an entire social life through 
face-to-face encounters. We call this strategy SPF (Social Participation through Face-to-face 
encounters). These strategies can be seen as two alternative technologies of social participation, 
represented by vectors ( )11, fs  and ( )22, fs , where s1 and s2 are the time devoted to online social 
participation by individuals respectively playing the SPN and the SPF strategy and f1 and f2 
represent the time devoted to face-to-face social participation by SPN and SPF players respectively, 
021 => ss , 012 ≥> ff  and 2211 fsfs +=+ . 
Unlike Antoci et al. (2012a, 2013a), we specifically consider the choice of social isolation 
by agents who prefer to devote all their time to work and to forms of  private consumption6  that do 
not entail any significant relationships. We call this third strategy NSP (No Social Participation). It 
is worth noting that, in our framework, this withdrawal from social relations does not imply 
retirement from work (as for hikikomori). In an NSP agent’s way of life, social relations are kept to 
a necessary minimum, and on-the-job interactions do not entail the formation of friendships. NSP 
individuals tend to replace relational goods (e.g. playing a match on a football field with 21 friends) 
with material goods (e.g. playing a virtual match at home on a PlayStation) in their consumption 
choices.  
The analysis shows that, depending on the configuration of payoffs, the state where all 
individuals play NSP can be locally attractive, i.e. it constitutes a social poverty trap where 
relational goods are produced and consumed in an extremely small amount and nobody participates 
in social activities. However, if the social networking strategy is rewarding enough in respect to the 
                                                
5 The Japanese term hikikomori refers to young people who have withdrawn from social life and have had no 
relationships outside of the family for a period of more than six months. After its rise in Japan, this phenomenon has 
been increasingly observed in other developed and developing countries (Kato et al., 2012). Hikikomoris do not work or 
participate in any form of education and frequently remain in their homes for protracted periods of time—sometimes for 
several years. From a psychological perspective that has long dominated public thinking in Japan, hikikomoris suffer 
from a cognitive malfunction. The sociological perspective, however, advances a more interesting interpretation of the 
phenomenon, as a form of anomie related to the nature of family relations and a breakdown in social and labour 
opportunity structures. In other words, the phenomenon can also be viewed as a reaction to the “relational poverty” of 
the social environment and to the lack of proper opportunities of social and labour participation (Furlong, 2008). 
According to Kaneko (2006), hikikomoris may be understood to be reacting to time pressures and role performances in 
modern societies. Before the advent of online networks, hikikomoris had no relevant social interaction. With the advent 
of the Internet, psychologists have observed resurgence in the social relationships of hikikomoris, who generally tend to 
have numerous online interactions with others (Kato et al., 2012). The case of hikikomoris will be useful for explaining 
our assumptions in Section 3. 
6 The literature on relational goods distinguishes private consumption that can be enjoyed alone without the inclusion of 
any significant social interaction, and relational consumption, which can be enjoyed only if shared with others (Gui & 
Stanca, 2010; Gui & Sugden, 2005; Uhlaner, 1989).  
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withdrawal from participation, then the state where all agents choose NSP becomes a saddle point. 
In this case, the use of the Internet for preserving and developing social ties avoids the social 
poverty trap, and the community reaches a steady state where all agents adopt the SPN strategy 
(which, under a certain configuration of payoffs, may also be globally attractive). This state, 
however, may be Pareto-dominated by the alternative state where all agents play SPF, and can 
therefore be viewed as a second-best scenario. 
Our results suggest that the “SPN way of life” may be interpreted as a coping response with 
which agents “react” to increasing busyness, a reduction in the time available for leisure, and the 
cultural and relational impoverishment of the social environment. From this point of view, this 
paper proposes a framework to better understand results from the empirical studies finding a 
complementarity between online and offline interactions, which suggested that forms of Internet-
mediated communication can play a crucial role in preventing the disruption of ties and the 
weakening of community life (Ellison et al., 2007; Sabatini and Sarracino, 2014). This argument 
implies that individuals who do not use the Internet (for example, because they do not have 
broadband access) may increasingly face problems of social integration. In this scenario, the digital 
divide is likely to become an important factor in social exclusion, which may exacerbate 
inequalities in well-being as well as capabilities. The literature has shown that social interactions 
and the accumulation of social capital positively influence subjective well-being (Becchetti et al., 
2008; Bruni & Stanca, 2008), health (D’Hombres et al., 2010; Yamamura, 2011a), education 
(Yamamura, 2011b; Misra et al., 2013), employability (Fugate et al., 2004; McDonald, 2011), 
economic welfare and social mobility (Degli Antoni, 2009; Yamamura, 2012), entrepreneurship 
(Alexy et al., 2012; Santarelli & Tran, 2013), access to credit (Shoij et al., 2012). 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature. Section 3 
describes our evolutionary game model. Section 4 analyses the dynamics of the model. Section 5 is 
devoted to a well-being analysis. The paper closes with some concluding remarks and implications 
for future research, followed by a mathematical appendix. 
 
2. Related literature 
In his best-seller Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam (2000) draws on various sources to document that 
a decline in social participation measures—such as membership in formal organizations, the 
intensity of members’ participation, informal social connectedness, and interpersonal trust—began 
in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s with a sharp acceleration in the 1980s and 1990s.  
The “decline of community life thesis” (Paxton, 1999, p. 88) advanced by Putnam prompted 
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a number of subsequent empirical tests. Based on General Social Surveys (GSS) data for the period 
1975–94, Paxton (1999) finds some decline in the general measure of social capital (given by a 
combination of trust and membership in associations), a decline in interpersonal trust, and no 
decline in associations. Costa and Kahn (2003) use a number of different sources to assess the 
development of social capital in the United States since 1952 by evaluating trends in participation 
and community life. The authors argue that the rise in female labour force participation and income 
inequality are two of the primary explanations for the decline in social capital, as measured by the 
indicators of volunteering, membership in organizations and entertainment with friends and 
relatives. Bartolini et al. (2013) use GSS data to investigate the evolution of social connections—
measured through membership in Putnam and Olson groups7 and the indicators of perceived 
trustworthiness, helpfulness and fairness, and confidence in institutions in the United States 
between 1975 and 2002, finding that they generally show a declining trend. 
Apart from the United States, there seems to be a common pattern of declining trust, 
political participation and organizational activity across industrialised democracies during the 1980s 
and 1990s, with the exception of China, Japan, Korea and the Scandinavian countries (Chen & Gao, 
2013; Lee, 2008; Leigh, 2003; Listhaug & Grønflaten, 2007). Declining trends of one or more 
dimensions of social capital have been documented for England and Wales over the period 1972–
1999 (Li et al., 2003), Great Britain over 1980–2000 (Sarracino, 2010) and Australia over 1960–
1990 (Cox, 2002)8.  
In Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) discusses three main explanations for the decline in 
American social capital: 1) the reduction in the time available for social interaction—related to the 
need to work more, to the rise in labour flexibility and to the expansion in commuting time; 2) the 
rise in mobility of workers and students; and 3) technology and mass media.  
                                                
7 Following Knack and Keefer (1997), the literature generally distinguishes two types of formal organisations, labelled 
“Olsonian” and “Putnam-esque” associations. Olson groups are those associations with redistributive goals that lobby 
for the protection of their members’ interests, possibly against the interests of other groups (Olson 1965, 1982). 
Examples of this type of organisation are professional and entrepreneurial associations, trade unions and associations 
for the protection of consumers’ rights. Putnam groups are those associations least likely to act as “distributional 
coalitions but which involve social interactions that can build trust and cooperative habits” (Knack & Kefeer, 1997, p. 
1273). Examples of this type of organization are cultural circles, sport clubs, youth associations (e.g. scouts) and 
religious organisations. 
8 Despite the many studies documenting the decline in social participation, the overall evidence still seems to be non-
conclusive. A number of empirical studies have found conflicting results on the trends of different indicators of social 
capital, and the Bowling Alone thesis has been variously characterised as plainly wrong, pessimistic or traditional 
(Stolle & Hooghe, 2005). Worms (2000) and Van Ingen and Dekker (2011) argue that the decline in associational 
participation may be related to a process of “informalisation” of social activities. In his cross-country analysis of social 
capital trends, Sarracino (2010) finds that in most Western European countries, several measures of connectedness 
experienced a growth over the period 1980–2000.  
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In the last decade, Putnam’s claims have found support in a number of studies investigating 
the effect exerted on various dimensions of social connectedness by the rise in working time 
(Bartolini & Bilancini, 2011), labour mobility (Routledge & von Ambsberg, 2003), urban sprawl 
and commuting (Besser et al., 2008; Wellman, 2001)9, the psychological distress related to the need 
to satisfy society’s expectations (Kaneko, 2006) and to the social poverty of the surrounding 
environment, which can prompt individuals to pursue social isolation, as in the case of Japanese 
hikikomoris (Furlong, 2008).  
As for the third argument, the role of technology and media in the evolution of social 
interaction is widely debated in the literature. Putnam advanced the hypothesis that technological 
progress may be partially responsible for the erosion of American social capital at the end of the 
1990s. This hypothesis was formulated just a few years before the “explosion” of the Internet and 
online networks. The author’s explanation of the possibly negative role of technology was centred 
on the socially detrimental effects of television and other forms of “private” entertainment, such as 
video games. This argument found support in several empirical studies proving the negative 
influence of television on social relations (Bruni & Stanca, 2006, 2008). 
All the studies mentioned above exclusively refer to face-to-face interactions and completely 
disregard online participation. However, in the past few years, Internet-mediated interaction has 
literally revolutionised individuals’ social lives. In contrast to the early age of the Internet, when 
being connected was predominantly an individual entertainment activity like watching TV or 
reading newspapers, today, the use of the Web is strongly related to participation in SNSs, which in 
turn entails a variety of forms of engagement in social activities.  
According to the Pew Research Center (PRC) Internet & American Life Project Post-
Election Survey, as of December 2012, 67% of U.S. Internet users were active on SNSs (67% use 
Facebook, 16% use Twitter, 15% use Pinterest and 13% use Instagram). More than four-fifths of 
online young adults (aged 18–29) and 77% of middle-aged adults (30–49) use SNSs (Duggan & 
Brenner, 2013). According to a survey conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates 
International in November 2010, among a sample of 2,255 adults, SNSs are used increasingly to 
keep up with close social ties; the average user of an SNS has more close ties and is half as likely to 
                                                
9 There is different evidence on the social effects of commuting outside of the United States. In countries where cities 
are, on average, significantly smaller than in the U.S., Putnam’s thesis seems not to be supported. A Swiss study by 
Viry et al. (2009) concludes that while commuting decreases the availability of emotionally bonding social capital in the 
form of supportive strong ties, it could provide increased opportunities for developing bridging social capital and weak 
ties. Wollebaeck and Stromsnes (2010) do not find evidence of a negative effect of commuting on civic engagement or 
connectedness in Norwegian cities. 
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be socially isolated as the average American; and Facebook users are more trusting than others, 
have more close relationships and are much more politically engaged than the average American. 
Internet users get more support from their social ties than those who do not use the Internet, 
Facebook users get the most support and Facebook seems to play a crucial role in reviving 
“dormant” relationships (Brenner, 2013; Hampton et al., 2011). Almost half of Internet users create 
and share original content online. As of August 2012, 46% of adult users post original photos or 
videos online that they themselves have created (Brenner, 2013). Sharing is also a way to keep 
loved ones posted on personal experiences, which proves particularly effective, for example, for 
workers and students living away from home. In December 2010, U.S. Internet users were found to 
be more likely than others to be active in some kind of voluntary group or organization: 80% of 
American Internet users participated in groups, compared to 56% of non-Internet users. Moreover, 
social media users are even more likely to be active: 82% of social network users and 85% of 
Twitter users are group participants (Rainie et al., 2011).  
These figures suggest to mitigate the fear of social isolation that the common wisdom 
generally associates with intense Internet usage. Several authors from different fields have begun to 
empirically analyse how participation in SNSs affects human relations. The findings of this strand 
of the literature support the hypothesis that online interactions play a role in the preservation and 
development of social ties against the threats posed by the weakening of community life and the 
erosion of the stock of social capital.  
SNSs have been claimed to support the strengthening of bonding and bridging social capital 
(Lee, 2013; Pénard & Poussing, 2010; Steinfield et al., 2008), children’s social activities 
(Bauernschuster et al., 2011) and the social integration and well-being of the elderly (Näsi et al., 
2012; Russel et al., 2008), to allow the crystallization of weak or latent ties that might otherwise 
remain ephemeral (Ellison et al., 2007; Haythornthwaite 2005), to help users to cope with social 
anxiety and negative moods associated with loneliness (Clayton et al., 2013; Grieve et al., 2013; 
Morahan-Martin & Schumaker, 2003), to support teenagers’ self-esteem, encouraging them to relate 
to their peers (Ellison et al., 2011; Trepte & Reinecke, 2013),  and to promote civic engagement and 
political participation (Campante et al., 2013; Gil de Zuniga, 2012; Kittilson & Dalton, 2011; Zhang 
et al., 201010.  
                                                
10 It is worth noting that part of the literature does not agree with the above reported claims about the beneficial effects 
of Internet-mediated interaction on social capital. Early sociological studies on computer-mediated communication 
shared the fear that the Internet would cause a progressive reduction in social interactions. The main argument shared 
by Internet sceptics was based on the presumption that the more time people spend using the Internet during leisure 
time, the more time is detracted from social activities (Gershuny, 2003; Katz et al., 1998, 2001; Kraut et al., 1998; Nie 
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Drawing on survey data from a random sample of 800 undergraduate students, Ellison et al. 
(2007) find that certain types of Facebook use can help individuals accumulate and maintain 
bridging social capital. Their results support the hypothesis that the social network helps students to 
overcome the barriers to participation so that individuals who might otherwise shy away from 
initiating communication with others are encouraged to do so through the Facebook infrastructure. 
In the authors' words, highly engaged users are using Facebook to “crystallize” relationships that 
might otherwise remain ephemeral.  
Steinfield et al. (2008) analysed panel data from two surveys on Facebook users conducted a 
year apart at a large U.S. university. Intensity of Facebook use in year one strongly predicted 
bridging social capital outcomes in year two, even after controlling for measures of self-esteem and 
satisfaction with life. The authors suggest that Facebook affordances help reduce barriers that 
students with lower self-esteem might experience in forming the kinds of large, heterogeneous 
networks that are sources of bridging social capital. However, the literature on Facebook suggests 
that the social network—and, more generally, Internet-mediated communication—serves more to 
preserve relations among offline contacts than to activate latent ties or create connections with 
strangers (Bauernschuster et al., 2011; Ellison et al., 2007; Pénard & Poussing, 2010). In one of the 
rare economic studies on the topic, Pénard and Poussing draw on data from the 2002 wave of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) from Luxembourg to find that people who already have a large stock 
of social capital are more likely to use the Internet to foster social relationships. In a recent paper 
based on data drawn from the 2008 section of the German Socio-Economic Panel and confidential 
data provided by Deutsche Telekom, Bauernschuster et al. (2011) find that having broadband 
Internet access at home has positive effects on an individual’s frequency of visiting theatres, the 
opera and exhibitions, and on the frequency of visiting friends. Exploring a sub-sample of children 
aged 7 to 16 living in the sampled households, the authors further find evidence that having 
broadband Internet access at home increases the number of children’s out-of-school social 
activities, such as playing sports, taking ballet, music or painting lessons, or joining a youth club. 
More recently, Sabatini and Sarracino (2014) used data drawn from the Italian Multipurpose 
Household Survey to analyse the impact of participation in social networking sites such as Twitter 
                                                                                                                                                                            
& Erbring, 2000; Nie et al., 2002). Studies emphasising the possibly negative correlation between Internet usage and 
sociability date back to just shortly before the explosion of online networking, which, in our view, has made their 
results anachronistic. Today, sceptic authors warn that, beyond a certain threshold, the development of human 
relationships by the exclusive means of online interactions may prevent users from enjoying those emotional benefits 
normally associated with face-to-face interactions (see, for example, Lee et al., 2011). A survey of the literature 
accurately describing the different positions on the role of Internet-mediated interaction in the accumulation of social 
capital is included in Antoci et al. (2013).  
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and Facebook and in chats, forums, and newsgroups, on “physical” social participation. The authors 
find that online participation is significantly and positively associated with the frequency of face-to-
face meetings with friends and acquaintances, even after controlling for endogeneity bias. 
In this paper, we suggest a theoretical framework for analysing the complementary role of 
offline (or face-to-face) and online interactions in the evolution of social participation implicitly 
suggested by the above-mentioned studies. Our contribution to this on-going debate consists in the 
development of an evolutionary game model analysing how human relations may evolve in a 
context potentially characterised by declining face-to-face interactions and growing online social 
participation. 
 
3. The evolutionary game model 
Let us assume that, in each period of time t, individuals play a one-shot population game (i.e. all 
agents play the game simultaneously) and that they have to choose (ex ante) one of the strategies we 
briefly introduced above:  
1) “No social participation” (NSP) 
 2) “Social participation with FF-interactions” (SPF) 
 3) “Social participation with SN-interactions” (SPN) 
As explained in the introduction, the NSP strategy entails withdrawal from every unnecessary social 
interaction. NSP agents devote all their time to work and/or to forms of private consumption, i.e. the 
consumption of goods that can be enjoyed alone. More specifically, following Antoci et al. (2012b), 
we assume that material products may replace relational goods, or at least may be used to 
compensate for the lack of human interaction, when the social environment has few opportunities 
for participation.  
The SPF strategy entails only physical encounters and excludes any computer-mediated 
interaction. 
With the SPN strategy, on the other hand, individuals participate socially through both 
online interactions and face-to-face encounters. In the SPN way of living, online interactions result 
in a certain degree of physical encounter as a by-product. This amount may be very limited; in this 
case, the social participation of individuals choosing SPN basically consists of online contacts with 
peers they will never meet in person. Or, by contrast, SPN agents may use online communication 
exclusively as a means to improve their face-to-face sociability. The empirical literature 
summarised in Section 2 shows that, in most cases, instant messaging, and interactions through 
social networks, emails and other kinds of Internet-mediated communication are preparative and 
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instrumental to physical interactions (Ellison et al., 2007, 2011; Gil de Zuniga, 2012; Steinfield et 
al., 2008). In the latter case, it would seem reasonable to assume a configuration of payoffs allowing 
the SPN strategy to Pareto-dominate on SPF. The share of time that SPN agents devote to physical 
interactions may also vary according to the characteristics of communities, reference groups and 
material needs. For example, if most fellow community members participate in online networks, 
then online contacts are more likely to be instrumental to actual interactions (Ellison et al., 2007, 
2011; Hampton & Wellman, 2003). Drawing on survey and ethnographic data from a wired suburb 
of Toronto, Hampton and Wellman (2003) show how high-speed, always-on access to the Internet, 
coupled with a local online discussion group, transformed and enhanced “neighbouring” through 
the increase in physical contacts with weaker ties, the improvement of strong ties, and the 
promotion of discussions and mobilization around local issues. Reference groups also play a crucial 
role in determining the extent to which online interactions entail physical encounters as a by-
product. Online communities may regularly arrange physical meetings, as generally happens in 
hobby networks, such as those of photographers connected through Flickr or specialised forums 
(Valenzuela et al., 2009). On the other hand, reference groups may act as a deterrent to physical 
encounters, as in the case of hikikomoris, who avoid face-to-face interactions and develop their 
entire social lives online (Furlong, 2008; Kato et al., 2012). Time and distance constraints also 
determine the extent to which online interactions generate physical encounters. According to the 
computer-mediated communication literature, online networks play a vital role in the preservation 
of social ties in spite of distance and mismatches in the time available for leisure. In fact, online 
social participation favours asynchronous interactions, which allow individuals to compensate for a 
lack of time; one can benefit from the others’ participation, for example, by reading and replying to 
a message or seeing a photo or a note and commenting on it, even if the person who wrote the 
message or shared the content is currently offline (Antoci et al., 2013).  
There are a number of reasons to distinguish SPF from SPN types of social participation and 
to consider both of them in our model (instead of only accounting for the SPN strategy). First, the 
SPN strategy entails positive activation costs; a device and access to the Internet are required for 
computer-mediated interaction. Residents in areas with no access to broadband Internet – due for 
example to the lack of proper infrastructures – may be particularly disadvantaged. In addition, 
participation through online networks requires specific relational skills. For example, one needs to 
update her/his Facebook account regularly, and to reply to comments and messages. The activation 
costs are particularly high for specific groups, such as the elderly or economically disadvantaged 
individuals, who may not even consider the possibility of computer-mediated communication. As 
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descriptive statistics clearly show, there is still a portion of the population who never use the 
Internet (Duggan & Brenner, 2013).  
In addition, the distinction between the two strategies allows us to point out that, even if the 
hypothetical scenario where all agents adopt the SPF strategy may be Pareto-superior, the 
possibility of playing the SPN strategy can lead to a second-best scenario, allowing society to avoid 
social poverty traps (i.e. those situations where all agents play NSP), as the dynamics described in 
this paper clearly show (see Section 4). From this perspective, the SPN strategy can be seen as a 
way to defend social interaction, which in respect to the SPF way of participation, has the 
advantage of being less vulnerable to the negative social externalities caused by any increase in a 
share of the population adopting NSP. In addition, Internet-mediated communication fosters 
coordination, making the SPN strategy more “efficient”. More in general, both the NSP and the SPN 
strategies can be seen as defensive choices through which individuals try to cope with deterioration 
in the social environment, for example, in terms of social participation opportunities. However, the 
SPN strategy creates positive social externalities, while the NSP does not (or worse, it may create 
negative social externalities). The case of hikikomoris can be used once again to illustrate this 
argument. In a world without the Internet, where the SPN strategy does not exist, hikikomori 
individuals are doomed to withdraw from social life. They become part of the NSP share of the 
population and their unavailability for social life negatively influences the sociability of others. 
With Internet-mediated interactions, i.e. the possibility of playing the SPN strategy, socially 
withdrawn individuals are at least available for online relationships and may positively contribute to 
the relational life of others. It can be argued that individuals who develop their entire social life 
online are likely to suffer from declining well-being and health, as studies on the detrimental effects 
of Facebook use suggest (Chou & Edge, 2012; Forest & Wood, 2012; Kim et al., 2009; Kross et al., 
2013). However, a complete retirement from any form of social life is doomed to produce even 
worse and irreversible effects, as demonstrated by hikikomoris before the growth of online 
networks.  
We represent the population of individuals with the vector ( ) 3321 ,, Rxxxx ∈= , where 1x , 
2x  and 3x  indicate the shares of individuals choosing strategies NSP, SPF and SPN, respectively. 
Thus 0≥ix , all i, and ∑ =
i
ix 1; so x belongs to the 2-dimensional simplex S. 
For simplicity, we assume that the payoff functions are linear in the variables 1x , 2x  and 3x : 
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where   , , , , , , ληεδγβα are strictly positive parameters, therefore ε −η < ε < ε +λ  and 
δββγβ +<<− . It is worth noting that our framework, though modelled as a population game, 
can also be seen as a game where, in each instant of time, a large amount of random pair-wise 
encounters takes place. In this latter context, matrix (2) represents the payoff obtained by each 
strategy (played by the row player) as a function of the strategy chosen by the opponent player:  
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SPF
NSP
SPNSPFNSP
               (2) 
 
and the functions in (1) give the expected payoffs of available strategies ( 1x , 2x  and 3x  are the 
probabilities to meet an individual choosing NSP, SPF and SPN, respectively, in random pair-wise 
encounters).  
Notice that parameters β and ε are pivotal, in that they measure the payoffs of “mixed 
encounters” between SPF and SPN players. More specifically, β is the payoff that an SPF player 
receives when she/he meets an SPN player and ε is the payoff received by an SPN player interacting 
with an SPN counterpart.  
In this scenario, the increase in the share x1 of the NSP population is always undesirable 
(being λεεηε +<<−  and δββγβ +<<− ). By contrast, any increase in x2 (x3 being constant) 
or in x3 (x2 being constant) always improves the payoffs of both SPF and SPN. 
Notice that SPN’s payoffs benefit more from increases in x3 (the share of the population 
playing SPN) than from increases in x2, and SPF’s payoffs benefit more from an increase in x2 (the 
share of the population playing SPF) than in x3. On the other hand, if x1 is constant, an increase in x3 
entails a reduction in the payoff of SPF and, vice versa, increases in x2 entail a reduction in the 
payoff of SPN. 
 
Assumption I: γβηε −>−  
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If all individuals adopt NSP (  11 =x and 0 32 == xx ), the payoff of SPN is higher than the payoff of 
SPF. In our framework, SPN is, in fact, a more rewarding response (than SPF) to the 
impoverishment of the social environment for at least two reasons. First, SPN players can benefit 
from the “global” stock of social capital accumulated worldwide on the Internet. This stock (KS) is a 
public good, in that it potentially benefits whoever is connected to the Web and adopts the SPN 
strategy. KS allows instantaneous or asynchronous interactions with people who are too distant, or 
who have different working hours, to physically interact with our population. It is worth noting that 
asynchronous interactions may further help people to reconcile constraints related to mobility with 
the need to take care of social relationships; when individuals cannot meet in person, or conduct 
long-distance chats due to time differences (think, for example, of one participant who works the 
night shift wishing to communicate with another who works the day shift), the social capital of the 
Internet offers the possibility of a quality, though deferred, interaction. Second, the use of Internet-
mediated interaction by SPN may allow a more efficient use of time, in that it entails a better 
coordination among agents and a higher diffusion of information on how to use leisure time. For 
example, Bauernschuster et al. (2012) find that Internet use is significantly and strongly associated 
with several forms of cultural consumption and satisfaction with leisure time in Germany. These 
mechanisms do not hold for SPF players because, in a limited though open population where 
everyone plays NSP and there is no “physical” participation, individuals cannot benefit from any 
stock of social capital (which, following Bourdieu (1980) exists only insofar as it is shared).  
In our framework, the stock of social capital is exogenously given. In fact, KS is accumulated 
because of the social participation choices of all individuals using Internet-mediated interaction 
worldwide, and cannot be influenced—not in the short run anyway—by the strategies adopted by 
the population in our framework. In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that KS has a lower 
velocity of variation in respect to the shares x1, x2 and x3 of the population adopting the three 
alternative strategies.  
 
Assumption II: γβα - >  
Matrix (2) indicates that, in random pair-wise encounters, interaction with an NSP player is more 
rewarding for NSP players than for SPF players. In the context of a population game, on the other 
hand, this assumption means that, if all individuals adopt NSP, the payoff of NSP is higher than that 
of SPF (the payoff of SPN is described above in Assumption I). This and the following assumptions 
allow us to limit the analysis to the more interesting cases where the state (  11 =x and 0 32 == xx ) 
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is a social poverty trap which, without the possibility of choosing the SPN strategy, would always 
be attractive.  
 
Assumption III: λεβ +<  
If the entire population adopts SPN (i.e.  13 =x and 0 21 == xx ), the payoff of this strategy is higher 
than that of SPF. In a world where everyone participates both through online networks and face-to-
face encounters, not being online is necessarily less rewarding than joining the networks. On the 
other hand, being outside of the network (i.e. playing the SPF strategy) implies an increasing 
relational cost. Consider, for example, an SPF-playing teenager whose classmates join Facebook. 
Not following them into the network may lead to the cooling of some relationships as well as to 
exclusion from those established through the activation of latent ties via Internet-mediated 
interaction.  
 
Assumption IV: δβα +<  
As a consequence, the payoff of the NSP strategy when all individuals adopt NSP (  11 =x and 
0 32 == xx ) is lower than the payoff of the SPF strategy when all individuals adopt SPF 
(  12 =x and 0 31 == xx ). 
 
Assumption V: λεα +<  
The payoff of the NSP strategy when all individuals adopt NSP (  11 =x and 0 32 == xx ) is lower 
than the payoff of the SPN strategy when all individuals adopt SPN (  13 =x and 0 21 == xx ). 
 
According to matrix (2), it is more rewarding for an SPF player to meet an SPN player (payoff: β ) 
than an NSP player (payoff: γβ − ). A matching with another SPF player provides the highest 
possible payoff ( δβ + ). SPN players also receive the highest possible payoff when they meet their 
fellow players. If the SPN strategy spreads at the expense of withdrawal from social participation 
(NSP), than its diffusion benefits all individuals who play SPN or SPF (with higher benefits for the 
former players).  
Assumptions IV and V, entailing that the state where all individuals adopt NSP is Pareto-
dominated both by the state where everyone plays SPF and by the state where the entire population 
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plays SPN, serve to restrict the analysis to the dynamics where the scenario (  11 =x and 0 32 == xx ) 
is always a “social poverty trap” (Antoci et al., 2007). This allows us to focus on the main objective 
of the model, i.e. to analyse how online networking may work as a “defensive choice” that reduces 
the risk of falling into the social poverty trap caused by a decline in social participation. 
The payoff of the NSP strategy is constant (and equal to α) and not subject to externalities. 
This strategy can thus be seen as a defensive behaviour aimed at protecting individuals from the 
negative consequences of a decline in social participation. As explained in Section 2, the same 
“protecting” role is played in the SPN way of participation. However, while NSP creates negative 
externalities for those who play alternative strategies, SPN creates positive externalities for SPN 
and, to a lesser extent, also for SPF players. SPF and SPN strategies, however, generate positive 
externalities only insofar as the increase in the respective shares of the population x2 and x3 is 
associated with a reduction in x1. If x1 is constant, then any increase in x2 (x3) generates negative 
externalities for SPN (SPF) players.  
We are aware that, in principle, the payoff of NSP may negatively depend on 3x  and 2x , for 
two reasons: 1) individuals playing NSP may be envious of those who work less and enjoy a social 
environment rich of participation opportunities; and 2) the adoption of NSP creates positive 
externalities on production. 
Our choice not to account for these relationships in the model is due to our focus on the self-
feeding mechanisms with which each strategy spreads among the population. In fact, each payoff 
grows as much as the related strategy spreads to the detriment of the other two. The assumption that 
the payoff of NSP negatively depends on x2 and x3 would not change the self-feeding nature of the 
diffusion mechanisms and its consequences in terms of welfare. 
In our evolutionary game model, at each instant of time t, the distribution of strategies 
[ ])( ),( ),( 321 txtxtx  determines their relative performances, which drives social evolution in the 
sense that the strategies that turn out to be more rewarding are imitated and, by replicating faster, 
manage to proliferate at the expense of the less rewarding ones. Time is continuous and the 
population is modelled as a continuum of players. Following Taylor and Jonker (1978), we assume 
that the growth rates iiii xdtdxxx /)/(/ =  of the shares ix , i = 1, 2, 3, are given by the well-known 
replicator equations (also see Weibull, 1995): 
 
     ( )Π−Π= NSPxx 11  
     ( )Π−Π= SPFxx 22      (3) 
 16 
     ( )Π−Π= SPNxx 33  
 
Where Π  represents the population-wide average payoff: 
 
   SPNSPFNSP xxx Π⋅+Π⋅+Π⋅=Π 321  
 
The dynamic system (3) is analysed in the Mathematical Appendix using Bomze’s (1983) 
classification for replicator equations. In the following section, we illustrate the basic features of 
dynamics generated by (3).  
 
4. Classification of dynamics 
In this section, we describe the possible dynamic regimes that can be observed under dynamics (3), 
defined in the 2-dimensional simplex (see Figure 1): 
 
   ⎭
⎬
⎫
⎩
⎨
⎧
==≥= ∑
i
ii xixxxxS 1 ,3 ,2 ,1  0,  :),,( 321  
 
Figure 1. The 2-dimensional simplex S. 
 
These regimes are illustrated in Figures 2-5. In these figures, the vertices )0,0,1(1 =e , )0,1,0(2 =e  
and )1,0,0(3 =e  represent the points where, respectively, only the strategy NSP, SPF and SPN is 
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adopted. An edge of the simplex S consists of all population states in which a given (fixed) strategy 
is not adopted; we shall denote by ji ee −  the edge joining ie  with je . Thus, the edges 21 ee − , 
31 ee −  and 32 ee −  are the edges where only strategies NSP-SPF, NSP-SPN and SPF-SPN are 
respectively adopted in the population of individuals.  
The vertices 1e , 2e  and 3e  are always fixed points under replicator dynamics (3). The other 
fixed points of replicator dynamics are the states in which all the strategies played by a strictly 
positive share of individuals give the same payoffs (see Weibull, 1995). In Figures 2-5, attractive 
fixed points are indicated by full dots, repulsive ones by open dots and saddle points by squares. 
The analysis contained in the Mathematical Appendix allows us to provide the following 
classification of possible dynamic regimes under dynamics (3): 
 
Case 1: 0≥−−= ηαεd  and 0≥−−=− δβεbe  
In this case, the vertex 3e , where all individuals adopt the strategy SPN, is globally attractive in the 
interior of the simplex S (see Figure 2); that is, every trajectory starting from a point in the interior 
of S approaches 3e . Notice that on the edge 21 ee − , where no one plays the SPN strategy, a bi-stable 
dynamic regime occurs: the stationary states 1e  and 2e  are locally attractive and their basins of 
attraction are separated by the repelling stationary state (indicated by the open dot) lying in the 
interior of the edge 21 ee − . Consequently, society collapses in 1e , where everyone withdraws from 
social participation, if the initial proportion of NSP players is high enough (and no one plays the 
SPN strategy). This means that, without the option of playing SPN—i.e. in the absence of online 
networks—the vertex 1e  acts as a social poverty trap, where the payoff of the entire population is, 
by assumption, lower than in 2e  (where the whole population plays SPF). The introduction of 
online networking (i.e. of the SPN strategy) then makes 1e  a saddle point. The SPN strategy plays 
the same role in preventing society from falling into a social poverty trap in Case 2, described 
below.  
 
Case 2: 0≥−−= ηαεd  and 0<−−=− δβεbe   
In this case, we obtain a bi-stable dynamics regime; that is, the vertices 2e  and 3e  (where all players 
adopt the strategies SPF and SPN, respectively) are locally attractive, while the other fixed points 
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are repulsive or saddles. The basins of attraction of 2e  and 3e  are separated by the stable branch of 
the saddle point lying in the edge 32 ee −  (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 2. Case 1: The vertex 3e , where all individuals adopt the strategy SPN, is globally attractive in the interior of the simplex S.  
 
 
Figure 3. Case 2: The vertices 2e  and 3e , where all players adopt the strategies SPF and SPN, respectively, are locally attractive. 
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Case 3: 0<−−= ηαεd  and 0≥−−=− δβεbe  
In this case, we also obtain a bi-stable dynamics regime. However, the attractive vertices are 1e  and 
3e  (where all players adopt the strategies NSP and SPN, respectively); all the other fixed points are 
repulsive or saddles. According to Bomze’s classification, this parameter configuration is 
compatible with three of the phase portraits—9, 37 and 38—shown in Bomze’s paper. These phase 
portraits possess the common feature according to which “almost all” 11 the trajectories of system 
(3) approach either 1e  or 3e . Figure 4 represents the phase portrait number 9; in this figure, the 
basins of attraction of 1e  and 3e  are separated by the stable branches of the saddle points lying in 
the edges 21 ee −  and 31 ee − . 
 
Figure 4. Case 3: The vertices 1e  and 3e , where all players adopt the strategies NSP and SPN, respectively, are locally 
 attractive. 
 
 
Case 4: 0<−−= ηαεd  and 0<−−=− δβεbe  
                                                
11 That is, excluding the trajectories coinciding with the other fixed points or those belonging to the stable branches of 
saddles. 
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Case 4:  0<−−= ηαεd  and 0<−−=− δβεbe  
In this case, all the fixed points in the vertices 1e , 2e  and 3e  are locally attractive; such parameters 
configuration is compatible with only two of the phase portraits illustrated in Bomze’s paper—7 
and 35. In these phase portraits, “almost all” (in the sense of footnote 11) trajectories approach the 
vertices 1e , 2e  and 3e . Figure 5 shows the phase portrait number 7, where there exists a repulsive 
fixed point in the interior of S and the fixed points in the edges are saddle points whose stable 
branches separate the basins of attraction of 1e , 2e  and 3e . 
 
 
Figure 5. Case 4: All the fixed points in the vertices 1e , 2e  and 3e  are locally attractive. 
 
 
5. Well-being 
Matrix (2) indicates that: 1) in the vertex 1e , where everyone plays the NSP strategy (  11 =x and 
0 32 == xx ), the NSP’s payoff is α ; 2) in the vertex 2e , where everyone plays the SPF strategy 
(  12 =x and 0 31 == xx ), the SPF’s payoff is δβ + ; and 3) in the vertex 3e , where everyone plays 
the SPN strategy (  13 =x and 0 21 == xx ), the SPN’s payoff is λε + . 
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Due to assumptions V and VI, we have δβα +<  and λεα +< ; the state 1e  where 
everyone plays NSP is Pareto-dominated by both 2e  and 3e . 
The analysis of dynamics has shown that 1e  can be locally attractive—i.e. it may be a social 
poverty trap—even if there is the possibility of developing human interactions online through the 
SPN strategy. However, if the SPN strategy is rewarding enough in respect to NSP (i.e. 
0≥−− ηαε ), then 1e  ceases being a trap, in that it becomes a saddle point.  
The state 2e , where everyone plays SPF, Pareto-dominates 3e , where everyone plays SPN, 
if λεδβ +>+ . If this is the case, it can be easily shown that vertex 2e  is locally attractive. This 
means that, in the dynamics described in Cases 1 and 3 (see Figures 2 and 4) of the previous 
classification, 3e  is never Pareto-dominated by 2e . However, in Cases 2 and 4 (see Figures 3 and 
5), 2e  can Pareto-dominate 3e  or vice versa, even if both states are locally attractive.  
In the former case, 3e  can be intended as a second-best equilibrium which, anyway, strictly 
Pareto-dominates 1e . In this scenario, the SPN strategy can prevent society from falling into the 
social poverty trap, but this entails convergence to state 3e , where all agents play SPN, which is 
Pareto-dominated by 2e  (where all agents play SPF). The configuration of parameters in the 
simplex’s vertexes assumed in this case reflects the claims emerging from the literature reviewed in 
Section 2: Internet-mediated interactions play a crucial role in preventing the disruption of ties 
against the threats posed by mobility, sprawl, the reduction in leisure time and the decline in social 
participation. These interactions do not substitute for physical encounters; rather, they are 
complements (Cuberes, 2013). From this point of view, a state where everyone plays SPF could be 
equivalent, in terms of well-being, to one where all agents play SPN. However, in contrast to face-
to-face interactions, online interactions may entail a number of negative consequences for 
individual well-being, which suggests that a state where all agents play SPF may be Pareto-
superior. That said, it must be remembered that the possibility of interacting online, i.e. to play SPN, 
wards off the worst possible state where all agents withdraw from social participation, i.e. they play 
NSP, and society falls into a social poverty trap.  
The latter case, where 2e  and 3e  are both locally attractive and 3e  Pareto-dominates 2e , 
accounts for the more optimistic views on the effect of online interactions on social capital and 
well-being, and for the hypothesis that social relationships exclusively based on physical encounters 
may also produce negative externalities in the sense of inhibiting the diffusion of the Internet and 
social networks. In communities where most individuals prefer to avoid computer-mediated 
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interactions, the diffusion of the Internet may in fact be discouraged and the risk of falling into a 
social poverty trap may be higher. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we draw on the empirical literature on social capital and computer-mediated 
communication to develop a theoretical framework analysing how human relations may evolve in a 
context characterised by the decline in face-to-face social participation documented by empirical 
studies and the rapid growth of online social participation that we have witnessed in recent years.  
We assume that individuals can react to increasing busyness and the reduction in leisure 
time by withdrawing from social participation, or by developing a part of their social relationships 
online in order to overcome the barriers of distance and time. As in Antoci et al. (2012a, 2013), 
interpersonal interactions can be developed through two alternative forms of social participation: 1) 
a social networking strategy, SPN, where participation takes place both by means of online 
networking and face-to-face encounters; and 2) a face-to-face strategy, SPF, which is entirely 
developed through in-person encounters and entails no Internet-mediated interaction. In addition to 
the hypotheses advanced in Antoci et al. (2012a, 2013), agents can choose to withdraw from social 
participation and to devote all their time to work and private consumption (NSP strategy).  
In a world where the only alternative to face-to-face interaction is withdrawal from 
participation, the state where nobody participates (i.e. all agents play NSP) is attractive, but 
constitutes a social poverty trap. The possibility of interacting online, on the other hand, offers an 
effective coping response, allowing individuals to “defend” their social life from increasing 
busyness and the reduction in leisure time, leading society to a state where all agents develop social 
interactions through a mixed strategy encompassing, to diverse extents, both physical encounters 
and involvement in online networks. In some cases, this is a second-best scenario that is Pareto-
dominated by the state where all agents participate only through physical encounters (i.e. by playing 
SPF). However, the possibility of playing SPN allows society to avoid the (otherwise attractive) 
worst-case scenario where nobody participates.  
This paper represents a new step in a research programme aimed at analysing the evolution 
of social participation and the accumulation of social capital in relation to economic growth and 
technological progress. In previous works, we highlighted how the reduction in the time available 
for social participation can trigger self-feeding processes leading to the progressive erosion of the 
stock of social capital (Antoci et al., 2012b, 2013). There, we analysed a scenario in which the time 
for social participation is an endogenous variable (i.e. it depends on agents’ allocation choices), 
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social relationships can be developed only by means of face-to-face interaction and agents may only 
react to increasing busyness by replacing participation with private activities—or, in other words, to 
replace the production and consumption of relational goods with the production and consumption of 
private goods. In the present paper, we address a scenario in which agents can also interact with 
each other through both actual encounters and online networking. A number of relevant research 
questions remain unanswered and are worthy of further investigation. In our analysis, we do not 
advance assumptions about how face-to-face and computer-mediated interactions may be 
distributed within the SPN strategy 
The role of online networks in the development of interpersonal relationships and in the 
preservation of social cohesion against the threat of social poverty traps suggest that individuals and 
communities who do not have access to the Internet—due, for example, to the absence of proper 
infrastructures such as broadband, or to lack of the skills required to participate in SNSs—may 
increasingly suffer from difficulties in social integration. In this scenario, the digital divide is likely 
to become an increasingly important factor of social exclusion, which may significantly exacerbate 
inequalities in well-being and capabilities. 
 
A. Mathematical appendix 
We analyse dynamics (3) by using Bomze’s classification (1983) for replicator equations. In order 
to use Bomze’s classification, we need to re-write the payoff matrix (2) in the following form:  
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with the first row made of zeros. 12 
Remember that, according to assumptions I–VI,   , , , , , , ληεδγβα are strictly positive 
parameters satisfying the following conditions: 
 
                                                
12 It is a well-known result that dynamics (3) does not change if an arbitrary constant is added to each column of A (see 
e.g. Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988, p. 126). 
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    ,    ,   ,-    ,   ,  λεαδβαλεβγβαγβηεηγ +<+<+<>−>−>  
 
These conditions imply: .  ,   ,    ,   0,   ,0   0, fcfecbdafba <<><>><   
In this appendix, we adopt the same terminology used in Bomze (1983). By an eigenvalue 
EV of a fixed point we shall understand an eigenvalue of the linearization matrix around that fixed 
point. The term EV in the direction of the vector V means that V is an eigenvector corresponding to 
that EV. IntS is the set { }3 ,2 ,1  ,0: =>∈ ixSx i  in which all strategies are present in the population. 
An edge of S consists of all population states in which a given (fixed) strategy is not adopted; we 
shall denote ji ee −  the edge joining ie  with je , where )0,0,1(1 =e , )0,1,0(2 =e  and )1,0,0(3 =e  are 
the vectors of the canonical basis which represent the states in which only strategies NSP, SPF and 
SPN are played, respectively. Thus, e.g. 21 ee − is the edge where only strategies NSP and SPF are 
present in the population. 
Let us first observe that the states in which only one strategy is adopted by individuals, ie , 
are always fixed points under replicator dynamics. Their stability properties are analysed in the 
following proposition13. For simplicity, the propositions in Bomze (1983) will be indicated as B# 
(so, e.g. B4 is Proposition 4 of Bomze’s paper). 
 
Proposition 1 The eigenvalue structure of the fixed points ie , i = 1, 2, 3, is the following: 
(1) 1e  has one eigenvalue with the sign of αγβ −−=a  ( 0<  always) in the direction of 21 ee −  
and one eigenvalue with the sign of αηε −−=d  in the direction of 31 ee − . 
(2) 2e  has one eigenvalue with the sign of δβα −−=− b  ( 0<  always) in the direction of 21 ee −  
and one eigenvalue with the sign of δβε −−=− be  in the direction of 32 ee − . 
(3) 3e  has one eigenvalue with the sign of λεα −−=− f  ( 0<  always) in the direction of 31 ee −  
and one eigenvalue with the sign of λεβ −−=− fc  ( 0<  always) in the direction of 32 ee − . 
Proof. Apply B1. 
 
The following proposition concerns the fixed points on the edges of S.  
 
 
                                                
13 All the eigenvalues of the fixed points on the edges of S are real (see Bomze, 1983). 
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Proposition 2 (1) A unique fixed point always exists in the interior of 21 ee − . The eigenvalues of 
such a fixed point have the sign of αγβ ++−=− a  ( 0>  always) in the direction of 21 ee −  and of 
baebd /)( − in the direction of the interior of S, where 0/)( <− baebd if and only if (iff): 
=−−−−−−−+=− ))(())(( αεαγβαηεαδβaebd     (5) 
      0))(()( <−+−−+−= εαδγαδβη  
(2) A unique fixed point exists in the interior of 31 ee −  iff 0<−−= αηεd ; no fixed point exists if 
such a condition does not hold. The eigenvalues of the fixed point in the interior of 31 ee −  (when 
existing) have the sign of d−  ( 0>  always) in the direction of 31 ee −  and of fcdaf /)( −  in the 
direction of the interior of S, where 0/)( <− fcdaf  iff: 
=−−−−−+−−=− ))(())(( αηεαβαλεαγβcdaf     (6) 
       0))(()( <−+−−+−= βαδηαλεγ  
(3) A unique fixed point exists in the interior of 32 ee −  iff 0))(())(( <−+−−=−− βλεδβεcfbe  
(i.e. iff 0<−−=− δβεbe , being  f > c always); no fixed point exists if such a condition does not 
hold. The eigenvalues of the unique fixed point in the interior of 32 ee −  have the sign of 
)/())(( fcbecfbe −+−−−  ( 0>  always) in the direction of 32 ee −  and of 
)/()( fcbecebf −+−−  in the direction of the interior of S, where 0)/()( <−+−− fcbecebf  iff: 
=−−−−+−+=− ))(())(( αεαβαλεαδβcebf     (7) 
      0)()( >−+−+= αεδαδβλ  
 
Proof. Apply B2 and B5. 
 
The remaining proposition concerns the fixed points in the interior of S, where all strategies 
are adopted.  
 
Proposition 3 There is a unique fixed point in IntS iff (see formulas (5), (6) and (7)): 
 
0>− cebf   0>− bdae  0>− afcd      (8) 
 
If such a condition does not hold, then there are no fixed points in IntS. 
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Proof. According to B6, a unique fixed point in the interior of S exists iff the expressions in (8) are 
all strictly positive or all strictly negative. A segment of non-isolated fixed points can exist only if 
the expressions in (8) are simultaneously equal to zero. So, to prove this proposition, we have to 
show that the expressions in (8) cannot be simultaneously equal to zero or strictly negative. 
Observe that 0≤− cebf  and 0≤− bdae  hold iff respectively: 
λ
εαδ
αδβ
)( −
≤−+       (9) 
η
εαδγ
αδβ
))(( −+
−≤−+      (10) 
Since, by assumption, 0>−+ αδβ , conditions (9) and (10) cannot be simultaneously satisfied. 
This proves the proposition. 
 
The above propositions allow us to give a complete classification of possible dynamic regimes 
under dynamics (2).  
 
Case 1: 0≥−−= ηαεd and 0≥−−=− δβεbe  
In this case, by Proposition 1, the fixed point 3e  (where all players adopt SPN) is locally 
attractive while 1e  and 2e  are saddle points. By Proposition 2, there is a unique fixed point in the 
edge 21 ee − , while there are no fixed points in the edges 31 ee −  and 32 ee − . Since 
0≥−−= ηαεd  implies 0>−αε , the expression aebd −  (see (5)) is strictly positive; therefore, 
the fixed point in the edge 21 ee −  has two strictly positive eigenvalues, that is, it is repulsive. 
Looking at all possible dynamic regimes shown in Bomze (1983), it is easy to check that these 
properties are compatible with a unique phase portrait in Bomze’s classification—phase portrait 
(Bpp#, hereafter) number 4214. This dynamic regime is shown in Figure 2 of our paper.  
 
Case 2: 0≥−−= ηαεd and 0<−−=− δβεbe  
In this case, by Proposition 1, the fixed points 2e  and 3e (where all players adopt SPF and SPN, 
respectively) are locally attractive while 1e  is a saddle point. By Proposition 2, there is a unique 
fixed point in the edge 21 ee −  and in the edge 32 ee −  while there are no fixed points in the edge 
                                                
14 When we say that a dynamic regime under equations (3) corresponds to a phase portrait Bpp# shown in Bomze’s 
paper, we mean that the two portraits are “geometrically equivalent” (see Bomze, 1983, p. 205), that is, the former can 
be obtained from the latter by flow reversal, rotations and reflections of the simplex S. 
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31 ee − . As in Case 1, the expression aebd −  (see (5)) is strictly positive; therefore, the fixed point 
in the edge 21 ee −  is repulsive. The unique phase portrait in Bomze’s classification possessing these 
properties is Bpp37. This dynamic regime is shown in Figure 3 of our paper.  
 
Case 3: 0<−−= ηαεd and 0≥−−=− δβεbe  
In this case, by Proposition 1, the fixed points 1e  and 3e  are locally attractive while 2e  is repulsive; 
by Proposition 2, there is a unique fixed point in the edges 21 ee −  and 31 ee − , while no fixed point 
exists in 32 ee − . Only Bpp9, Bpp37 and Bpp38 are compatible with these features of dynamics. In 
Bpp9, there exists a fixed point in the interior of S (that is, condition (8) holds), which is, however, 
a repulsive point, and the fixed points in the edges 21 ee −  and 31 ee −  are saddles; the 
corresponding dynamic regime is illustrated in Figure 4 of our paper. In Bpp37 and Bpp38, no fixed 
point exists in the interior of S (that is, condition (8) does not hold); in Bpp37, the fixed point in the 
edge 21 ee −  is repulsive, while that in 31 ee −  is a saddle; vice versa, in Bpp38, the stability 
properties of such points depend on the sign of the expressions in (8) (see Proposition 2).  
 
Case 4: 0<−−= ηαεd and 0<−−=− δβεbe  
In this case, by Proposition 1, all the fixed points 1e , 2e  and 3e  are locally attractive; by Proposition 
2, there is a unique fixed point in the edges 21 ee − , 31 ee −  and 32 ee − . Only Bpp7 and Bpp35 are 
compatible with these properties. In Bpp7, there exists a fixed point in the interior of S (that is, 
condition (8) holds), which is, however, a repulsive point, and the fixed points in the edges 21 ee − , 
31 ee −  and 32 ee −  are all saddles; the corresponding dynamics is illustrated in Figure 5 of our 
paper. In Bpp35, no fixed point exists in the interior of S (that is, condition (8) does not hold); one 
fixed point in the edges is repulsive while the others are saddles (the stability properties of such 
points depend on the sign of the expressions in (8))—see Proposition 2).  
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